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The New
Supreme Court
Philip B. Kurland
Prognostication
is at best an inexact science. It is
doubly so when the object of prophecy is an
in itution whose membership is subject to
change-and as events of the past year suggest-often
quite unexpectedly. As is sometimes pointed out, the
strength of the academic critic of the judicial process
derives almost entirely from his capacity for 20-20
hindsight. One is sometimes able to point out judicial
errors. It is usually necessary, restricting somewhat the
pens of regular contributors to legal scholarship, that
they first be committed.
Professor Thomas Reed Powell used to say that he
could analyze Supreme Court opinions by feeling the
bumps on the heads of the Justices. However accurate
that observation, the bumps on a crystal ball give con­
siderably less guidance.
The Supreme Court's docket for the recent Term
indicates that the sharp change in personnel has not
been reflected, at least immediately, in a similar change
in its business. This may be a temporary situation, for
the nine Justices have the enviable opportunity to pick
only one hundred cases from the approximately three
thousand that are proffered to them each year. On the
other hand, it is the kind of business disposed of by the
State courts and the lower federal courts that largely
determines the substance of the Supreme Court's work.
Address delivered by Philip B. Kurland, Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago Law School, before
the 14th Annual Michigan Judicial Conference, Sep­
tember 23, 1969.
As in preceding years, the 1969-70 calendar contains
problems of administration of criminal justice; prob­
lems of racial discrimination; problems of church and
state; problems of freedom of expression for dissent­
ers; and problems of reapportionment. In short, the
staple of the last few years will continue to confront
the "New Court" as it did the old one. But these prob­
lems will not come to the Nixon Court with the same
virginal qualities they had when the Warren Court
first met them. Too much has been done that cannot
be undone. Nor will a Court with but two new mem­
bers-or even four-wish to undertake a broad restruc­
turing of recently made constitutional law. Indeed,
the new Court, from what little we know about its
new members, is likely to feel more compelled to ad­
here to the principle of stare decisis than did the War­
ren Court.
For the most part then, I do not think that there
will be any major retreats from recent decisions. The
concepts of racial desegregation, of judicial control
over reapportionment, of the application of most of the
first Eight Amendments to the States are, I think, here
with us to stay. But if the Court is not likely to retreat,
neither is it likely to break much new ground. It will,
I predict, be more cautious than was its predecessor in
seeking judicial solutions to society's most difficult
problems.
Let me talk then of some of the major areas of
problems that will most likely confront the Nixon
Court. Certainly the decisions of the Warren Court
3
"the new frontiers ... in
the administration of
criminal justice will
be few."
4 that have aroused the most opposition from the public
and the States and, not least, in the halls of Congress
are those opinions concerned with appropriate proce­
dures for the administration of criminal justice. It is
of importance that myth be dissipated and that catch­
words be rejected if the Court is properly to deal with
these problems. The myth is that the Court by its deci­
sions is responsible for the increased crime wave in the
country. This notion is dependent solely on the fact
that during the existence of the Warren Court there
has been an increase in the crime rate. The conclusion
is offered that because of this coincidence, there must
be a cause and effect relation between the two. I sub­
mit that there is no validity to this -conclusion. The
Court can no more be blamed for the increase in crime
than it can be blamed for the Vietnam War or the
unabated prosperity that also accompanied the tenure
of Chief Justice Warren.
On the other hand, to the extent that the Warren
Court has not adequately justified its conclusions in
these cases and the others that it has decided, it has
contributed to a disdain for law and its processes, not
only among the criminal elements in the community
but equally among the more respectable portions of
the community. When three Presidents and five Con­
gress�s can condone a war that lacks constitutional
sanction, when a Governor of a State can use troops
to forestall the effectuation of a federal judicial decree,
when unions and other organizations can set their
own views as superior to those of the courts and the
legislatures, when universities can protect their stu­
dents against punishment for illegal acts, when police
can ignore the requirements of judicial due process
by taking punishment into their own hands, we are
dangerously close to the dissolution of a society gov­
erned by law instead of by will. Lawlessness is indeed
rampant. But the Court's decisions in the areas of
criminal procedure cannot bear the responsibility for it.
Nor are we helped by resort to the rhetoric of po­
litical campaigns in criticism of the Court. It was long
before the Warren Court began its program to make
the State courts conform to the same rules that the
Constitution makes applicable in the federal courts
that Mr. Justice Frankfurter warned us �gainst the
danger of using slogans as answers to hard problems.
In On Lee v. United States, he said:
Loose talk about war against crime too easily in­
fuses the administration of justice with the psy­
chology and morals of war. It is hardly conducive
to the soundest employment of the judicial process.
Nor are the needs of an effective penal code seen
in the truest perspective by talk about a criminal
prosecution's not being a game in which the Gov­
ernment loses because its officers have not played
according. to the rule. Of course criminal prosecu­
tion is more than a game. But in any event it should
not be deemed a dirty game in which "the dirty
business" of criminals is outwitted by "the dirty
business" of law officers. The contrast between
morality professed by society and immorality prac­
ticed on its behalf makes for contempt of law. Re­
spect for law cannot be turned off and on as though
it were a hot water faucet.
;\ s I said, I do not expect the Nixon Court to re­
n treat from the expansion of federal rules of crim­
inal procedure to the State courts. I do think, however,
that changes of these structures brought about by legis;
lative action will be readily accepted. If either Congress
or the State legislatures were to turn their attention
to reform of their criminal procedures in order to
achieve the ends of ordered liberty, I expect the Court
would be receptive to these efforts. And I would be sur­
prised if the Court would not prove amenable to
change if the States were to come up with some means
other than the exclusionary rule for effectively policing
their police. I do not mean, of course, that anything
the legislature does will prove acceptable. Like Senator
Sam Ervin, I am dubious that a law authorizing "pre;
ventive detention" can be drawn in such a way as to
satisfy the clear mandates of the Constitution.
There is one aspect of this field in which, I should
hope, the Court may break new ground. One of the
most serious challenges to the efficacy of our systems of
criminal law enforcement derives from the failures of
these systems to afford speedy justice. I know of noth­
ing that creates such disdain for American criminal
law as the failure to impose sanctions within a rea­
sonable period after arrest of a guilty person.
All in all, I believe that the new frontiers that will
be pushed back by the Court in the area of adminis­
tration of criminal justice will be few. These problems
are essentially now left with the legislatures and the
other branches of the judiciary for successful adminis­
tration.
In another area of the Warren Court's efforts, I ex­
pect a similar judicial restraint to be exhibited by the
new Court. The "simplistic" one-man, one-vote rule­
the adjective is Professor Paul Freund's-has been car­
ried about as far as it can go. The problems to be faced
by the new Court here will be different ones. Most im­
portant, of course, will be questions of gerrymander­
ing, which the one-man, one-vote rule has made easier,
not harder. It was, I submit, the gerrymander that first
brought the Warren Court into the "political thicket."
But Gomillion v. Lightfoot was concerned with the
most patent use of the gerrymander for imposition on
Negroes. It was decided under the Fifteenth Amend­
ment, not the Fourteenth. I should think that gerry­
manders that would be brought within the Gomillion
rule would still be subject to abatement by the Court.
On the other hand, the Warren Court itself was re­
luctant to enter the arena on such questions, and I do
not expect that the Nixon Court will be more ame­
nable to such action.
The Baker v. Carr line of cases, however, will create
another challenge. For, when the one-man, one-vote
thesis is combined with the decision striking down
California's infamous "Proposition Fourteen," they
raise questions about all sorts of State and local gov­
ernment procedures that call for more than a major­
ity vote for the promulgation or repeal of legislative
acts. I do not expect an outburst of new doctrine from
the new Court on these questions. But they will have
to be faced. And the proper answers, are anything but
clearly marked.
In the third major subject of the Warren Court's
business, the effectuation of desegregation, the Nixon
Court is unlikely to have need for the creation of new
rules. Again, one should not look for a retreat. The
problem is now largely in the hands of the national
legislature and the national executive. Their powers
are far greater than any the Court can bring to bear.
And the essential issue of a peaceful resolution of the
Negro Revolution is certainly not within the power
of the High Court to resolve. Such legislation as Con­
gress enacts or will enact, and such executive action
as the President may take, will probably receive sym­
pathetic treatment from the new Court. Whether the
Court will be as amenable as the Warren Court was in
reading the 1866 legislation or even the 1965 Civil
Rights Act may be questioned. But a responsible judi­
ciary will be hard put to find adequate reasons for
playing dog-in-the-manger with reference to actions
taken, however reluctantly by the politically responsi­
ble divisions of the national government. If legisla­
tures, State or federal, should make provisions for "in­
verse discrimination," for example, I expect that the
Nixon Court will sustain them.
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One open question
for the Nixon Court may well
arise with regard to the church and state cases in
the offing. Strangely, I expect that the new Court will
prove more reluctant rather than less to approve aid to
parochial schools, a problem certain to reach the Court
as a result of Flast v. Cohen. On the other hand, I
expect the new Court will rely on history-for I doubt
that it will be willing, anymore than the Warren
Court was willing-to sustain the various exemptions
from taxation afforded to religious bodies, which will
also be subject to attack. I suggest that it will rely on
history, for reason is hard put to explain why a direct
subsidy by way of relief from obligations that all oth-
"the vague-for­
voidness cases"
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.
ers must bear should be valid. And I expect some form
of evasion of the question that will come to it in a
multitude of forms-just as the Warren Court evaded
the issue by the most blatant rewriting of a Congres­
sional statute-the question whether exemption from
military service can rest on religious affiliations or
beliefs.
Two starts of the Warren Court can be developed
rather freely by the Nixon Court. The first is repre­
sented by Shapiro v. Thompson, the case holding in­
valid a local residence requirement for qualification
for certain welfare benefits. There are two ways that
the case could expand. One is solely with reference to
other similar State requirements of residency, in such
highly important areas as voting for example, or with
regard to some less important matters, such as hunting
and fishing licenses. Any such residency requirements
might well fall for the same reason that felled the wel­
fare residence requirement, because of its inhibition on
what the Warren Court regarded as the right to travel.
Implicit in Shapiro v. Thompson, however, is a
broader doctrine. That case could prove to be the
lever to pry open the heretofore closed provisions of
the Fourth Article and the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Privileges and Immunities Clauses. I think that
the Warren Court was reluctant to utilize these clauses
because their benefits were, by the very language of
the Constitution, confined to citizens. Inasmuch, how­
ever, as the Court has already precluded distinctions
between citizens and noncitizens because of the de­
mands of the Equal Protection Clause, this reluctance
should be dissipated. Moreover, it would seem that the
historical intent of the writers of the Fourteenth
Amendment was for the Privileges and Immunities to
be an explosive principle. Having made Negroes citi­
zens by reason of the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress expected to
protect the rights of the newly-made citizens through
other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
not least through the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, I submit, can better be
read as a Privileges and Immunities case than as a
"right to travel" case. For the right to travel might
properly be placed, as it once was, in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Here is a tabula rasa on which the
Nixon Court could make its reputation, whatever that
reputation might prove to be.
The other open invitation for the Court of the future
to impose its own will is to be found in the Warren
Court's revival of the concept of substantive equal pro­
tection. Substantive equal protection is, of course, but
another name for that hated substantive due process
that was supposed to have died when the Nine Old
Men were converted into the Roosevelt Court. It had
never really disappeared. For, as must be clear to
everyone, every legislative, executive, judicial or ad­
ministrative act involves a problem of classification.
Even the so-called void-for-vagueness cases-which I
prefer to call the vague-for-voidness cases-can be ra­
tionalized in terms of improper classification and,
therefore, as a violation of equal protection. If memo­
ries of Truax v. Corrigan give rise to doubts as to the
desirability of such a doctrine, I can only suggest that
they should.
Insofar as the new Court feels bound by precedent,
its decisions will be restrained by those made by the
Warren Court in the major areas of its operation:
criminal procedure, reapportionment, desegregation.
But with these two tools, with an expansive Privileges
and Immunities Clause and an even more expansive
substantive equal protection concept, the Nixon Court
will be able to work its will at least as effectively as
did its predecessors. But when I say at least as effec­
tively, I do not mean to suggest that the Warren Court
has been effective. Segregation is still the rule rather
than the exception; police misbehavior is pretty much
unreduced; school prayers and similar breaches in the
wall of church and state are limited to but a small
degree; and, if reapportionment has occurred widely,
it has been reapportionment designed by the political
parties and not an accommodation to the ideals of rep­
resentative democracy.
There are a few strong personal beliefs that I haveabout the Supreme Court. The first is that the
Court is not a democratic institution, either in makeup
or function. It should be seen for what it is, even at the
cost of that grossest of contemporary epithets: "elitist."
It is politically irresponsible and must remain so, if it
would perform its primary function in today's harried
society. That function, evolving at least since the days
of Charles Evans Hughes, is to protect the individual
against the Leviathan of government and to protect
minorities against oppression by majorities.
Essentially because its most important function is
antimajoritarian, it ought not to intervene to frustrate
the will of the majority except where that is essential
to its functions as guardian of the interests that would
be otherwise unprotected in the government of the
country. It must, however, do more than tread warily.
It must have the talent and recognize the obligation
to explain and perhaps to persuade the majority and
the majority's representatives that its reasons for its
frustration of majority rule are good ones.
The Warren Court accepted with a vengeance the
task of protector of the individual against government
and of minorities against the tyranny of the majority.
But it failed abysmally to persuade the people that its
judgments have been made for sound reasons. Its fail­
ure on this score was due to many causes of which
I can catalogue but a few. One is that its docket was so
overcrowded with lesser business that it could not con­
centrate its efforts on the important constitutional
questions that came before it. A second is that its corn­
munication with the public had to come essentially
through the distortions of the news media, who would
not invest the time, effort, or space to the careful job
that is necessary exactly because the Court has no
power base of its own. A third reason for the failure,
if I may say so, was the judicial arrogance that refused
to believe that the public should be told the truth in­
stead of being fed on slogans and platitudes. The
fourth problem was that many of the Justices were
incapable of doing better. There is need for intelli-
gence and integrity on the high bench that goes far
beyond an average I.Q. and a distaste for venality.
For the Court, in performing what is, by definition,
an unpopular task, is none the less dependent upon
popular support to keep it a viable institution.
If the Court's substantive function is impaired by
these defects, so. too is its important symbolic office.
Some time ago Felix Frankfurter wrote:
A gentle and generous philosopher noted the other
day a growing "intuition" on the part of the masses
that all judges, in lively controversies, are "more or
less prejudiced." But between the "more or less" lies
the whole kingdom of the mind, the difference be­
tween "more or less" are the triumphs of disinterest­
edness, they are the aspirations we call justice....
The basic consideration in the vitality of any system
of law is confidence in this proximate purity of its
process. Corruption from venality is hardly more
damaging than a widespread belief of corrosion
through partisanship. Our judicial system is abso­
lutely dependent upon a popular belief that it is as
untainted in its workings as the finite limitations of
disciplined minds and feelings make possible.
And here again the Warren Court failed us. What
Arthur Schlesinger has termed a crisis of confidence
clearly extends to the Supreme Court. The restoration
of that confidence is vital to the continuance of the
rule of law in this country. For above everything else,
the Supreme Court is symbolic of America's prefer­
ence for law over force as the ruling mechanism of
a democratic society. If it fails, the vital center disap­
pears, and we "must ultimately decay either from an­
archy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by use­
less shadows."
The Nixon Court has awesome tasks before it: To
match the Warren Court aspirations for the protection
of individuals and minorities. To restore the confi­
dence of the American people in the rule of law. One
or the other is not enough. •
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Logic, Anecdote
and Social Cost
Richard A. Posner
Torts
is not my field. But in one sense neither
is it Guido Calabresi's, although he is a pro­
fessor of tort law at the Yale Law School. In
neither The Cost of Accidents nor the series of earlier
articles of which the book is a summation and amplifi­
cation will the reader find more than passing mention
of the rules and concepts that constitute the body of
accident law or of the procedures and institutions by
which that law is formulated and applied. Few cases
are discussed and, if I recall correctly, no statutes.
To note the untraditional character of Calabresi's
concerns is not to criticize, but to mark a new direc­
tion in legal scholarship. It is no secret that many law
professors have lost interest in the traditional under­
takings of legal research. These were two: determin­
ing what the law was and determining what it should
be. But in practice they usually turned out to be the
same. In both cases, one first sought to isolate the basic
premises or policies underlying an area of the law by
a close reading of judicial opinions and, where appli­
cable, statutes and legislative history, and then compar­
ing the specific rules of law developed by the courts
with these premises. If a rule was found to be incon-
.
sistent with the premises, it was rejected as an aberra­
tion or, if too well established for that, as bad law. To
Based upon a book review of Calabresi, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTs-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS by Richard
A. Posner, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago
Law School. (Published in University of Chicago Law
Review, Vol. 37, No.3, p. 636.)
be sure, rules were sometimes found wanting on
grounds other than inconsistency with the dominant
policies in the field-usually these had to do with the
fact-finding or remedial limitations of the judicial pro­
cess-but for the most part logical consistency with
premises derived from legal documents was the touch­
stone of analysis. Legal scholarship consisted of the
interpretation and logical elaboration of legal mate­
rials.
This _is not the complete story, because from at least
Brandeis' time there was also a branch of legal schol­
arship that emphasized facts rather than logic, gener�
ally facts that demonstrated that the premises of a
body of law were out of touch with contemporary so­
cial reality. They can more accurately be described,
without invidious intent, as anecdotes: The "facts"
marshalled by Brandeis and other fact-oriented legal
reformers were for the most part stories (not neces­
sarily untrue) told to legislative committees, rather
than a product of rigorous empiricism.
The limitations of textual analysis, logic, and anec­
dote as tools of inquiry should be apparent. But they
do not explain why the traditional approach has fallen
into disfavor among a number of legal scholars. To­
day there are legal scholars-I would guess a growing
number-who believe that over a broad range of sub­
jects they will make greater progress utilizing the
theories and empirical procedures of the social sciences
than continuing to depend exclusively on the methods
of traditional legal scholarship.
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({The goal ... is to
optimize accident costs."
10 The Cost of Accidents is an ambitious effort to em-
-ploy a social science perspective in a field of law in
which, when Calabresi started his work, there was no
supportive tradition, no pioneering work by econo­
mists or other social scientists on which to rely. In its
bold break with conventional legal analysis of tort
questions, Calabresi's work may be a portent of the
future direction of legal scholarship in fields that,
unlike antitrust, remain bastions of the traditional ap­
proach.
By this time the reader must be impatient to findout what exactly the book has to say. Its salient
points can be summarized briefly.
Accidents impose costs. Those costs, in the Cala­
bresian terminology, are primary (personal injuries
and property damage), secondary (economic disloca­
tion resulting from failure to compensate the victim of
an accident), and tertiary (the costs of administering
any scheme designed to reduce primary or secondary
accident costs). The object of accident law or policy
should be to bring about the socially preferred acci­
dent-cost level. Notice that the goal is not to minimize
accidents or accident costs, unless by accident costs we
mean costs net of any benefits. Traffic accidents could
be eliminated by banning motor vehicles. But the price
would be too high. The goal, rather, is to optimize ac­
cident costs.
Its attainment is complicated by the reciprocal char­
acter of the compon�nts of those costs. A plan that re­
duced secondary costs-for example, a scheme of com­
pulsory social insurance against accidents-might in­
crease primary accident costs by reducing the incentive
to avoid an accident. A plan designed to reduce acci­
dents by (say) forbidding liability insurance would
concentrate accident costs and thereby aggravate the
secondary-cost problem. Schemes to reduce tertiary
(adininistrative) costs could increase both primary and
secondary costs. And so on.
He distinguishes two basic approaches. The first is
the market, or in his terminology "general deterrence,"
approach. In its pure form, the market approach in­
volves no government regulation of accident-produc­
ing activities at all; the level of accidents is determined
entirely by voluntary arrangements among members
of society. Thus, the number of coal miners killed each
year would be a resultant of the demand for coal, the
attitude of coal miners toward risk, the costs of safety
devices, and the costs of other inputs. If the demand
for coal was very large, if safety devices were very
costly, and if the supply of coal miners willing to work
for moderate wages despite highly dangerous condi­
tions was also large, then the mortality rate among
coal miners would be relatively high. But suppose in­
stead that prospective coal miners are highly risk
averse. They will demand very high wages, or safety
devices, or both. The costs of mining coal will now be
higher and the output smaller, unless coal operators
can readily substitute other inputs for labor. Either
way fewer miners will be employed; perhaps there
will be safety devices, too. Mortality in the mines will
be reduced. The important point is that whatever the
risk preferences of miners may be, the level of mine
accidents will be- determined by voluntary transactions
in the marketplace.
Unfortunately, it costs something to negotiate in the
marketplace, and on occasion the costs of voluntary
arrangements determining the number of accidents
may be prohibitive: Pedestrians cannot get together
and negotiate with drivers in the same fashion that
coal miners can with coal operators. Where, as in this
example, private contracting is precluded by high
transaction costs, it may still be possible, through law,
to simulate a market result. The trick is to impose
the costs of the accident on that participant or contrib­
utor who, by a change in his activity, can reduce those
costs net of any benefits. This would produce the same
result as would private contracting. However, it may
be unclear which accident contributor should be in­
duced to alter his activity. A rule making the driver
always liable in a car-pedestrian accident might induce
auto manufacturers to install safety devices in in-
stances where a cheaper way of avoiding the same
number of accidents might be to build pedestrian over­
passes.
Calabresi's criticism of the market or general-deter­
rence approach to the problem of primary accident
costs sets the stage for a discussion of the alternative
approach, "specific" or "collective" deterrence. The
term means direct public regulation of safety, as in
traffic rules and in laws requiring the installation of
seat belts in all new cars. The distinction between mar­
ket and collective deterrence
.
is unfortunately quite
unclear. Some types of safety regulation, such as traffic
rules, can, it seems to me, be explained better in mar­
ket-deterrence than in collective-deterrence terms. Im­
agine a state in which the highways were privately
owned and there were no traffic laws. One would
expect the highway owners to establish rules of the
road, speed limits, and the like for the same reason
that auto manufacturers installed some safety devices
even before they were required by law to do so-in
order to promote use of their product by meeting the
user's demand for safety. These rules might be more lax
or more stringent than those imposed by governments;
my point is only that many safety regulations, and
specifically the traffic regulations that loom large in
Calabresi's discussion of specific deterrence, need not
reflect any dissatisfaction with the level of accidents
determined by the market. These regulations are im­
posed by the community because the community is
the proprietor of the transportation facility, the road.
Even where the government is not a proprietor, its
safety rules may instance market rather than collective
deterrence. Collective deterrence, as a functionally dis­
tinct mode of regulation, comes into play when the
government decides that the violator of a rule shall be
made to pay a fine or be imprisoned rather than mere­
ly held liable for any injuries or damage that he may
cause.
Safety-belt, mine-safety, and like laws are something
else again. Their rationale is pure paternalism. They
force people to pay more to protect themselves (not
strangers) than they would voluntarily pay.
Calabresi concludes that a mixed system of general
and specific deterrence is desirable: The appropriate
proportions he regards as a mixed empirical and
political question. Having established the goals and
methods of accident control, he then asks whether
the prevailing system of accident control in this coun­
try, the "fault system" (negligence law), is a rational
system for optimizing accident costs. He concludes
that it is not. The fault system not only ignores the
problem of secondary costs, save by permitting private
insurance; it actually aggravates them by delaying
compensation until the conclusion of an often lengthy
jury trial or settlement negotiation. The dependence
on costly and time-consuming judicial processes also
multiplies tertiary (administrative) accident costs. The
fault system is not good at optimizing primary acci­
dent costs either. The notion of "fault" is freighted
with moral concepts that get in the way of so allocat­
ing liability as to reduce the net costs of accidents.
Furthermore, liability is determined by the facts of
each particular case rather than by those of an entire
class of cases. Moreover, the judge considers only who
between the parties before him is better able to reduce
accident costs, although someone not before the court
at all (e.g., the auto maker) might be even better.
Finally, the ability of the fault system to devise dis­
criminating rules of liability is limited by the degree
to which insurance companies find it commercially
feasible to establish different risk classes. Calabresi
concludes that the fault system is "absurd" and "in­
effective" as a system of accident control.
11
so brief a summary of The Cost of Accidents cannotdo justice to the author's graceful if somewhat
sinuous and elusive style or to the excellent if sometimes
protracted discussions of detail with which the book
abounds. But it can indicate the dominant character­
istics of his approach, which are two: reliance on eco­
nomic theory, and a weak sense of fact. His debt to
economic theory is most obvious in the use of a variety
"reliance on economic
theory) and a weak
sense of fact."
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. of economic doctrines to establish key points in the
analysis: to show why wide cost spreading might not
'increase the welfare of society, why schemes of sec­
ondary-cost reduction could impair incentives to avoid
accidents, why the complete elimination of accidents
would not promote welfare, what the market can and
cannot do to bring about a socially preferred level of
accidents, how the presence of monopoly might alter
the analysis, and in a host of lesser ways.
At points I find myself in disagreement with his
use of economic doctrine. For example, the unwilling­
ness of contemporary economists to ascribe an auto­
matic increase in total welfare to any redistribution
of income from a wealthier to a poorer person stems
not from rejection of the assumption of the diminish­
ing marginal utility of income, but from recognition
that the interpersonal comparison of utilities is arbi­
trary. But on the whole, Calabresi's handling of eco­
nomic doctrine seems, to me at least, highly competent.
Calabresi's debt to economic theory is greater than Ihave indicated. That theory supplies the very
structure as well as the details of analysis. The form of
The Cost of Accidents is that of "cost-benefit" or "sys­
tems" analysis. These terms describe techniques of ap�
plied economics that involve (1) an initial specification
of goals, (2) the arraying of alternative methods of
achieving these goals, and (3) the costing out of each
alternative. Calabresi begins by setting forth the goals
of accident law. He. derives these goals from broad
considerations of social policy rather than from tort
cases or other legal materials. He then describes the
full spectrum of alternative methods for achieving
these goals; and this procedure immediately carries
him beyond the conventional bounds of tort doctrine
and into areas usually thought to belong to the admin­
istrative and criminal law fields. Although he never
actually costs out these alternatives, it is significant
that his analysis is cast in terms of comparing their
costs and that he subordinates considerations (such as
"justice") that are not susceptible of precise and objec-
tive description. In principle, his analysis could pro�
vide a framework for a quantitative evaluation of alter­
native accident-control schemes; at least, the consider­
ations relevant to evaluation have been carefully
marshalled.
The utilization of this systematic procedure to bring
elementary but profound insights of economic theory
to bear on the accident question proves a powerful
forensic and analytical machine with which Calabresi
easily sweeps rival approaches, employing more con­
ventionallegal analytic methods, from the board. He
demonstrates that these methods overlook important
consequences of different accident-control schemes,
proceed on no coherent theory, and provide little use­
ful guidance to policy makers; and that an approach
grounded in the procedures and theorems of econom­
ics offers greater promise. This is the heart of his
achievement. His failure is in exaggerating the utility
of the economic (or any other) approach when unin­
formed by facts.
One sees this most clearly in his discussion of the
fault system. I noted previously the strong language
in which Calabresi rejected the possibility that the
fault system might approximate the model of an effec­
tive accident-control system that emerges from his
analysis of goals and alternative methods for achieving
them. But his reasoning is analytic rather than empiri­
cal and the analysis is not compelling. That "fault"
is not a term that an economist seeking to optimize
accident costs by identifying the cheapest accident
avoider would use is hardly dispositive. The question
cannot be answered by reference to a dictionary.
Nor is it clear a priori that in deciding tort cases
judges consider only the relative abilities of the par­
ticular parties before them to minimize net accident
costs. It is open to a party to prove that not it but a
stranger to the proceeding-the manufacturer of the
automobile, the contractor who built the roadway, the
city that installed (or failed to install) the traffic sig­
nals-was the one "at fault," or to seek contribution
from some other party, alleging it to be a joint tort-
feasor. And perhaps the experience accumulated in a
series of trials involving accidents of similar types does
enable insurance companies to identify accident-prone
activities, people, procedures, and equipment and fixed
premiums accordingly. A more disturbing character­
istic of present insurance practices is that the accident
costs of the most dangerous drivers are systematically
shifted to the less dangerous. Compulsory-insurance
schemes now widely in force require insurance com­
panies to insure, at rates not much above normal, those
drivers whose driving records or other characteristics
make them such poor risks that no company would
voluntarily insure them at rates that the driver would
be willing to pay. Such insurance is written at a loss,
the deficit being made up by other policyholders.
With features such as these, the fault-cum-insurance
system is open to valid criticism. But a compulsory­
insurance scheme that encourages accidents is not in­
evitable. We could if we wished require that drivers
obtain adequate liability insurance at whatever was
the competitive rate for their risk group-this to assure
that the costs of their accidents be made costs to them
-and simply bar from the roads any driver who failed
to obtain that insurance. Otherwise we are subsidizing
accidents-more concretely, permitting people to kill
and maim without bearing the costs of such conduct.
The weakness is not in the fault system; it is in the
public regulation of the insurance industry.
While it is apparently true that the ratio of admin­
istrative overhead to claims paid is higher in the fault
system than in most nonfault social or private in­
surance schemes, that is the wrong comparison. The
fault system has a function beyond compensation:
the deterrence of accidents. However large the admin­
istrative costs of the system in relation to the com­
pensation paid under it, they may be well worth
incurring if the tort system is responsible for even a
small reduction in the accident rate-traffic accidents
alone cost society billions of dollars every year-un­
less the same deterrence could be obtained at lower
cost by the use of another system. Finally, since I
reject Calabresi's assumption that people are psycho­
logically incapable of voluntarily Protecting them­
selves by insurance, I conclude that the fault system
need not entail an intolerable problem of secondary
accident costs.
13
My argument is not that the fault system is in factsuperior to alternative systems of accident con­
trol but that a judgment is impossible without studying
how the system operates. Economic theory will help us
to design the necessary studies, but in this instance,
at least, it will not yield the answer in advance.
The book, in short, furnishes a useful perspective
on the problem of accident control but not a predicate
for deciding between competing solutions, and this
I suspect will be a frequent characteristic of the new
version of legal scholarship exemplified by The Cost
of Accidents; at least it is a major pitfall. A taste
for proposing new organizing principles need not be
accompanied by interest in devising methods of em­
pirical research that will enable us to use those prin­
ciples to add to our knowledge of how the legal
system operates and could be improved. Indeed, it
may imply a lack of interest in a useful and familiar
if insufficient technique of empirical legal research:
the close reading of cases.
Calabresi's defense, offered early in the book, is
that "if we waited for such facts concerning the
actual operation and effects of accident law to be
adequately proven before we made societal changes,
we would rarely if ever depart from the status quo."
But one could as plausibly argue the reverse: The
status quo that Calabresi so deplores-the fault sys­
tem-is likely to continue to resist change in the
area of his primary concern, traffic accidents, until the
alleged shortcomings of the present system are veri­
fied by empirical research. This need not mean for­
ever. Empirical research has already proceeded fur­
ther in the accident field than in most other areas
of the law, although one would hardly guess this
from The Cost of Accidents. Calabresi cites exhaus-
continued on page 21
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A Sense
of Twilight
Grant Gilmore
I
shall speak to you tonight sombrely about what I
conceive to be a sombre period in the history of
the Republic, whose citizens we are, in the history
of the law, whose servants we are, in the history of jus­
tice, toward which, as citizens and as lawyers, we
aspire.
Just two years ago, suddenly, unexpectedly and, as it
turned out, briefly, a new spirit of hope was at large in
the land. The results of the presidential primary in
New Hampshire, a state which has long been known
for the almost cynical corruption of its politics, sug­
gested that the system could, on its own terms, still be
made to work. Despite the extraordinary progress that
had been made in the provision of techniques for con­
trolling the thought and predicting the behavior of the
electorate, the unexpected, it appeared, could still hap­
pen. There were sources of energy, hitherto unsus­
pected, which could be tapped. The dead slogans, the
worn-out cliches of an apparently closed political sys­
tem could perhaps be invested with vitality and fresh­
ness in a newly opened society. Previously alienated
young people came, in impressive numbers, to explore
the possibilities which Senator McCarthy's lonely win­
ter travels had revealed. Their state of euphoria-and
ours-did not survive the assassinations in April and
in June of that year.
It was fashionable, not so many years ago, to say
Remarks by Grant Gilmore, Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago Law School on the occasion of
Alumni Day, February 27, 1970.
that ideology was dead. All the great social problems
had been solved-or, at the least, their proper solution
was apparent to anyone who cared to look into the
matter. All that remained to be done was to maintain
and service the great machine, which could be ex­
pected to go on running indefinitely. That, the tech­
nicians could do for us. This curious idea sounds sus­
piciously like the early Marxist fantasy about the
withering away of the state, once the revolution has
been achieved. It was in fact the received doctrine
among the social theorists-if that is the right name
for them-during the placid years of the Eisenhower
administration. The world, we were told, would no
longer be a particularly exciting place. The last moun­
tain peak had, indeed, been climbed. The quest for the
Holy Grail had been indefinitely postponed; it was no
longer entirely certain that there was such a thing as
the Holy Grail. We might, in the future, be bored but
we would be well taken care of-comfortable, secure,
content, even quietly happy. Ecstasy was not in the
cards-but who wants ecstasy?
Utopia, as we have always been told by the special­
ists who have considered the point, is an intolerable
state-like some Sunset Village where everything has
been conceived and designed for the comfort and con­
venience of its elderly, broken-down and mentally in­
firm residents. So we need not be surprised that the
Utopia which was so confidently proclaimed in the
1950's-the decade, we might say, of the senior citizen,
aptly symbolized by its genial presiding ofllcer-
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Phil C. Neal
There
are different points of view from which
one might phrase the question as to the role
of students in the governance of law schools.
There is one which, to me, seems particularly appro­
!'riate. It is this: How can student participation in the
governance of law schools improve the quality of law
schools and of legal education?
Starting from that point of view, I may as well be­
gin with a forthright disclosure of my own benighted
convictions, confident that I shall at least perform
the humble service of providing a decent target for
those who will follow me. I see little reason to hope that
our current absorption with the formal modes of stu­
dent involvement in the governance of law schools is
a path toward the improvement of legal education. I
think it is a dreary road that leads to a dead end,
one that exacts a heavy toll in time, uses the least
important talents of our students and faculty, and car­
ries us toward an environment that is more stifling than
invigorating.
This view, which may be shocking, is not based on
antipathy toward students nor on mistrust of their ob­
jectives, although I know that it may be misunder­
stood. Nor, I think, does it reflect a lack of apprecia­
tion of the contribution that some of them can make
Statement by Phil C. Neal, Dean of the University of Chi­
cago Law School, at a panel discussion of (The Role of
Students in the Governance of Law Schools: at the Ameri­
can Association of Law Schools' Convention in San Fran­
cisco, December 28, 1969.
in proper ways to a better perception of the aims and
methods of legal education. My antipathy is not to
students but to the idea of governance as a guiding
principle in the enterprise of education. My concern
is that preoccupation with the role of students leads
inevitably to preoccupation with governance, and
magnifies the role of governance in an endeavor that
should have as little of it as possible.
Questions of student participation apart, it is un­
likely that we would find ourselves today talking
about problems of the governance of a law school.
Some rather drab subjects have from time to time
made their way into programs of this Association or
into the pages of the Journal of Legal Education but
happily the topic of governance has not been promi­
nent among them. I suppose that until now most would
have regarded it as a non-subject, and it is a significant
but gloomy commentary on the state of affairs that we
could muster this much of an audience to hear a discus­
sion of it now.
The students who seek formal modes of exerting
their influence on the character of a law school have
a misconception about the nature of the enterprise and
an illusion about how it in fact operates. What is true
of universities is equally true of law schools, and I
cannot put the point better than Harry Kalven has
recently done in speaking of universities: "The heart
of the activity-what one studies, thinks about, teaches,
does research on-those activities which are the reason
for his being at a university, are by a proud tradition
placed virtually beyond the reach of governance. Ideal-
19
20 ly, a university is a collection of anarchists, each being
'allowed to pursue truth in his own way. In a deep
sense, the better the university the less there is to
govern." And the least interesting aspects of university
life are those which are subject to governance. The or­
ganizational principle of the university ... is anarchy
-the right kind of anarchy.
This is not mere rhetoric designed to parry student
ambitions and not a mere statement of an ideal. It is
closer to a description of the reality than any table of
organization would be.
How little there is of governance in the ongoing
business of a law school is something soon learned by
most faculty members and all deans. It will be said,
and of course it is true, that there are committees on
this and that, there are meetings, there are reports, and
the faculty occasionally does something by vote. But
ordinarily this is a fitful and desultory process. The
issues of policy that get resolved by this process in
ordinary times are surprisingly few. The number that
are important is even smaller, and the number having
to do with improving the quality of legal education is
almost negligible.
We need to ask ourselves how it is that innovation
and reform come about in law schools. It is not by
governance. It is seldom by committees. And even
where a significant committee report can be identified,
I am confident that investigation would show that it
was largely the work of one man. The reason is not
obscure. Our problems are in the realm of ideas and,
even more important, the elaboration and implernen­
tation of ideas. They have little to do with arriving at
a common will, which is the business of governance.
A committee may resolve that urban studies should be
developed, or even that particular courses should be
offered. Nothing will come of it, and indeed the idea
itself is unlikely to be propounded, unless there is a
particular individual who sees it as important to en­
gage in the painful creative task of exploring the field,
organizing its problems, and putting together a course.
To take but one example, can one imagine that Henry
Hart's course on the Legal Process could have been
born in committee? Where is the striking course or
the important field of the law whose addition to the
law school curriculum owes its genesis to the work
of a committee or the deliberations of the faculty?
When one turns to other areas of the enterprise in
which committees customarily function, such as ad­
missions, administration of academic rules, and the
appointment and promotion of faculty members, the
problems are different but the same general question
is appropriate: What reasons are there to believe that
participation by students will improve the overall
quality of the judgments that are made? Putting
aside all other difficulties, how are the students to be
found who will have the capacity, the sustained inter­
est, and the desire to spend their time in such unpro�
ductive fashion, that will enable them to do a better
job than the faculty members who presently carry out
these generally unwelcome responsibilities?
The number of faculty members who function effec­
tively on committees is itself small. It seems to me
extraordinary to suppose that there are significant
gains in the efficiency or quality of these activities to
be found in any available procedure for choosing stu­
dents or of using them in the short time they can
serve. To the contrary, I am reasonably confident that
the effort to do so involves substantial losses in the effi­
ciency if not the quality of the process.
Such negative views do not imply that students have
nothing to contribute to the policy of a school or to the
direction in which legal education will move. The
point is that there are abundant opportunities for that
contribution to be made without obsession with the
empty questions of structure and governance. We need
ideas. We need to take account of the criticism and
the special perspective that new generations of stu­
dents bring to our problems. Those students who have
something to say should find no difficulty in getting
attention for compelling ideas. I cannot imagine a fac­
ulty that would not welcome or be influenced by a
thoughtful and well-reasoned report of an individual
student or a group of students on any problem of legal
education. Such reports being as rare as they are in the
case of faculty members, the opportunity is in a sense
very great.
One would think that law students especially would
respond to this challenge if they are interested in the
problems, since they have chosen a career that puts
high value on the arts of reasoned analysis and persua­
sion. But this kind of contribution is one that not
many students are able or willing to make. Hard work
is involved. The stock of ideas that students can bring
to old and difficult problems is understandably limited.
The most capable students will recognize the difficul­
ties and, for the most part, will rightly conclude that
there are better and more interesting ways to use their
time. The result is, I am afraid, that most efforts of
students to become involved in these matters take the
form of superficial proposals based on whatever hap­
pen to be the current cliches of reform that leap from
one law school to another.
We should by all means encourage thoughtful con­
sideration of the problems of legal education by stu­
dents, and listen to what they have to say. I doubt very
much that the process is going to be much advanced
in the long run by institutional arrangements, whether
in the form of joint committees, parallel committees,
representation at faculty meetings, or whatever other
devices a particular school may see fit to adopt. There
seems little reason to believe that whatever contribu­
tions students can make cannot be made by them as
students rather than as participants in governance.
The elements that make for excellence in law schools
arc ideas, intellectual climate, and incentives. More
governance will not improve these elements. In rela­
tion to the environment of a law school, governance is
really a form of pollution. If we would preserve the
vitality of our institutions, we must hope that we will
recognize governance for what it is before it is too late.
Perhaps it is already too late. •
Logic, Anecdote and Social Cost
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tively to the economic literature on an obscure point
of theoretical welfare economics, but he does not
enlighten the reader as to the state of empirical re­
search in the accident field. From a casual survey,
it appears that the existing empirical work is almost
exclusively concerned with the compensation aspect
of the accident-control problem. And studies of the
level, costs, and timing of the reparations received
by accident victims do not illuminate what should be
the central question of public policy in this area:
whether the fault system is better at reducing the
net costs of accidents than alternative systems. But
it is possible to conceive of studies that would cast
considerable light without immoderate length, cost, or
complexity. Let me suggest three:
1. One could compare accident rates in jurisdictions
having different accident-control schemes or rules
(are pedestrians more careless in jurisdictions in
which contributory negligence is no longer a de­
fense? ), and in the same jurisdiction before and
after a change in tort law or other relevant insti­
tutional change.
2. As my colleague Harold Demsetz suggests, one
could collect either instances where changes in
technology altered the relative costs of accident
avoidance and ask whether the rules of liability
were changed to conform, or instances where the
rules changed and ask whether the changes fol­
lowed technological developments that affected
the relative costs of accident avoidance.
3. One could ask how many of the doctrines of ac­
cident law currently in force can be deduced from
the premise that the purpose of such law is to
reduce the (net) costs of accidents.
Perhaps such projects would prove more difficult to
undertake than I think. There is ground for optimism
in the fact that accidents, unlike some other important
subjects of interest to the student of legal institutions,
such as collusion, are not covert. At all events, I see
no other way of making substantial forward progress
in the accident-control area; and perhaps this is a
point with general application to legal scholarship. •
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GARY H. PALM has recently been
appointed Director of the Mandel
Clinic and Assistant Professor of Law
at the Law School.
Mr. Palm received his A.B. in 1964
from Wittenberg University and his
J.D. in 1967 from the University of
Chicago Law School. At the Law
School he was Order of the Coif
and active in the Mandel Clinic.
Prior to returning to the Law
School to resume his present position,
Mr. Palm was an associate for three
years with the Chicago law firm of
Schiff, Hardin, Waite, Dorschel &
Britton. In addition, for the past
several years he has been active in the
Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Center, an agency on the near
north side providing free legal
assistance to the poor.
PROFESSOR DAVID P. CURRIE
has recently been appointed
Co-ordinator of Environmental
Quality for the State of Illinois.
As such he will act as Advisor to
Governor Richard Ogilvie on all
matters relating to the environment.
His department will have responsi­
bility for directing the investigation
of environmental problems and mak­
ing recommendations on appropriate
legislation. His Chief Deputy will be
Michael G. Schneiderman '65. Prior
to the appointment, Professor Currie
had been a recently appointed member
of the State of Illinois Air Pollution
Control Board.
Currie received his A.B. from the
University of Chicago in 1957 and
his LL.B. from Harvard Law School
in 1960. Following graduation he
Profiles
Gary H. Palm
served as law clerk to Judge Henry J.
Friendly of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals during 1960-61 and to
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
United States Supreme Court during
1961-62. In 1962 he was named
Assistant Professor of Law at the
Law School and Professor of Law
in 1968.
His major fields of interest have
been Conflict of Laws and Federal
Jurisdiction. His most recent publica­
tions include: Federal Courts: Cases
and Materials,' with Roger
Crampton, Conflict of Laws: Cases
and Materials,' The Federal
Courts and the American Law Insti­
tute: Part I, 36 U.Chi.L.Rev.1;
Part II, 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 268; and
Appellate Review of the Decision
Whether or Not to Empanel
A Three-Judge District Court, 37
U.Chi.L.Rev. 159.
His most recent interests have
concerned environmental questions.
In 1968 he reviewed Sax, Water
Law in the University of California
Law Review. Last year he published
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution:
State Authority and Federal Pre­
emption, in the University of Michi-
David P. Currie
gan Law Review. In addition, last
year he began teaching courses in
Urban Renewal and Land Use Plan­
ning, and Natural Resources. The
latter was an effort to draw together
materials from scientific, economic
and political science journals as sup­
plements to traditional legal materials
in the fields of administrative law,
federalism, and local government
in an effort to intelligently define
resource problems and to' formulate
and evaluate appropriate legislation
for dealing with them.
Currie will be on leave from the
Law School during the period of
his appointment.
PROFESSOR DALLIN H. OAKS has
recently been appointed Execu-
tive Director of the American Bar
Foundation, succeeding Professor
Geoffrey Hazard in that position.
Oaks had recently been on leave from
the Law School serving as Counsel to
the Bill of Rights Committee of the
Illinois Constitutional Convention.
His appointment was effective June,
1970.
Oaks received his A.B. in 1954
from Brigham Young University and
Dallin H. Oaks
his J.D. in 1957 from the University
of Chicago Law School where he
graduated cum laude, and Editor-in­
Chief of the Law Review. Upon
graduation he served as law clerk to
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the
United States Supreme Court. After
three years in private practice with
the Chicago law firm of Kirkland,
Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters,
in 1961 he returned to the Law School
to become Associate Professor of
Law.
His major teaching and research
interests have been in the areas of
trusts, estate and gift tax, criminal
procedure and judicial administration.
His most recent publications include
a revision of Bogert's Cases on the
Law of Trusts and with Warren
Lehman, A Criminal Justice System
and the Indigent: A Study of Chicago
and Cook County. In addition, Oaks
was author of The Criminal Justice
Act in the Federal District Courts,
published as a Committee Print
for the Subcommittee on Constitu­
tional Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The Criminal Justice Act
of 1964 made provision for counsel
for indigents accused of federal
crimes. The study was based upon
the experience of six Federal Districts
in administering the Act and upon
numerous interviews and correspon­
dence in other Districts with judges,
United States attorneys, defendants,
their counsel, probate officers and
administrative personnel.
Drawing upon his diversified ex­
perience in legal services areas, Oaks
was the organizer of the Law School's
Summer Fieldwork Fellowship Pro­
gram. This program has provided
financial support to date for over 7�
law students working summers in t>a
variety of legal services agencies such
as the public defender, community
renewal, probation and parole services,
correctional institutions and juvenile
courts. The program was intended
to provide a full summer's exposure
to types of legal services and social
problems other than those typically
studied in the formal curriculum.
Over the years Oaks has held a
wide variety of administrative posi­
tions in the University and in the Law
School. He was Associate Dean and
Acting Dean at the Law School for
six months in 1962. He has been
Chairman of the Curriculum Com­
mittee. In 1969 Oaks acted as Chair­
man of the nine-man University
disciplinary committee. This commit­
tee processed charges against 150
students, all of which grew from the
student occupation of the Adminis­
tration Building at the University
of Chicago in 1969.
Like Professor Hazard, Professor
Oaks will maintain partial teaching
responsibilities at the Law School
during the period of his appointment
at the Bar Foundation.
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This year's first-year course inresearch and writing will again
be supervised by Professor Norval
Morris. In addition to their primary
responsibilities in research and writ­
ing, the Bigelow Fellows will again
be given the opportunity to teach in
small sections as part of the first-year
course in Criminal Law.
The Bigelow Fellows for 1970-71
will be: Jannette Barnes who received
her LL.B. degree from the London
School of Economics in 1968, and
LL.M. degree from New York
University Law School in 1969, and
is currently a candidate for the J.S.D.
degree at the University of Virginia
Law School; Donald W. Fyr, who
graduated Order of the Coif in 1964
from Northwestern University Law
School where he was Associate Editor
of the Law Review. Since 1964 he
has been associated with the Chicago
law firm of Wilson & McIlvaine;
Wayne McCormack, who received his
J.D. degree from the University of
Texas where he was Associate Editor
of the Texas Law Review, and was
recently law clerk to Judge Walter
Ely of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Mrs.
Pauline Vaver, from New Zealand,
who received her LL.B. degree and
M.Jur. degree with First Class
Honors from the University of Auck­
land; Donald J. Weidner, who re­
ceived his J.D. degree in 1969 from
the University of Texas Law School
where he was Project Editor of the
Texas Law Review. He was recently
an associate with the New York
firm of Willkie, Farr & Gallagher.
Law Women's Caucus
24 The Law Women's Caucus, on
'February 9, 1970, filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Commission charging the Law
School and three law firms with
violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The discrimination alleged
was the Law School's operation of
a Placement Office which made its
facilities available to firms that dis­
criminate against women, and the
School's failure to adopt an exclusion­
ary policy toward those firms.
The incidents prompting the charge
took place during the last interview
season. Women students had com­
plained of employers' statements
indicating discrimination against
women: by refusing to hire, by ap­
plying higher standards in hiring or
advancing women, by paying them
lower salaries or by assigning women
only to traditionally "female" de­
partments such as trusts and estates.
Other statements involved a law firm's
"fair share" of women, their stereo­
type "submissive" and "passive"
qualities or the "demands" of the
clients.
All of the above practices appear
to be violations of the Act. The Law
School's involvement is derivative.
The Act provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an
employment agency to fail or refuse
to refer for employment, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individ­
ual because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ...
" The
argument is, first, that the Law School
Placement Office is an "employment
agency" within the terms of the
Act and that it "otherwise discrimi­
nate( s)" when, after being informed
that a firm has illegally discriminated
against a woman student, it con­
tinues to make its placement facilities
available to that firm.
Following the incidents of the fall,
the women suggested that the School
clearly articulate its position on sex
discrimination and then establish an
enforcement mechanism which would
prohibit groups practicing sex dis­
crimination from using its placement
facilities. In recent years, allegations
of sex discrimination had become
increasingly frequent.
The School responded that, since
the policy proposed by the women
would not take effect until the fall
of 1970, a faculty committee should be
appointed to fully review the matter.
The women preferred to begin
sooner. On February 4, 1970,
in a letter to the Dean, they stated
they would file a charge with the
EEOC "to help clarify the nature of
these obligations and to assist in
working out a policy toward dis­
criminating law firms which is con­
sistent with the requirements of Title
VII."
On April 3rd, the faculty commit­
tee, consisting of Professors Fiss,
Kaplan and Meltzer, issued its ten­
page report. The report recommended
that a statement be included in the
placement brochure stating clearly the
legal profession's obligation to comply
with the federal prohibition of dis­
crimination on grounds of race, reli­
gion, or sex. "We trust that our
placement facilities will be used only
by those who are prepared to dis­
charge that obligation." The report
also recommended that an additional
statement be included which
would describe various types
of sex discrimination: "The pur­
pose of the statement would be
informative and educative, ... (to)
remind the recruiters of the fact that
they are likely to interview a signifi­
cant number of girls at the Law
School; that the federal laws and our
commitment to equal employment
opportunity cover discrimination on
the basis of sex; and point out to
them the kinds of practices that we
would regard as discriminatory by
way of summarizing the nature of the
complaints we received during the
past fall."
The reasons for the absence of the
recommendation of strict enforcement
mechanisms was also discussed in
the report: "The statement we rec­
ommend simply sets forth the
requirements of law and a limitation
of the invitation to use the placement
facilities. We also believe that the
statement avoids making any com­
mitment to an elaborate enforcement
mechanism. The Law School must
rely on the honesty, good will, and
professional integrity of lawyers­
perhaps all that we can rely on.
We make no pretense of being com­
mitted to any independent surveillance
of the employment practices of the
law firms and agencies that use the
Placement Office. We do not have
the resources to make such a com­
mitment, and such a commitment
would seriously divert our energy and
resources from our overriding
educational purposes."
The report instead recommended
that when instances of discrimination
are alleged, the School should inform
the firm, by letter, of the complaint
and invite a response, to dispel mis­
understandings and to clarify the
firm's policy.
The Law Women's Caucus re­
sponded to the faculty report memo­
randum in a letter entitled, with
some preview of disagreement, "One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back."
Their chief complaints were with the
strength and clarity of the "state­
ment" on discrimination and, as a
practical matter, the absence of
effective enforcement mechanisms.
They felt the faculty report lan­
guage, "We trust that our placement
facilities will be used only by those
who are prepared to discharge that
obligation" would, in effect, be read
by employers as a "hope" by the
School that the employers "would
behave themselves."
Their more serious disagreement
was in the area of enforcement. They
felt that the normal response to the
letter would be a full denial of all
the specifics of the complaint-for
example, that the triggering statement
was taken out of context, that the
interviewer did not make the alleged
remark, and that, regardless of the
interviewer's remark, the employment
practices of the firm indicate that
there has not been any discrimination.
Instead, they suggested that as a pre­
condition to the use of the placement
facilities employers be required to
sign an exculpatory statement dis­
avowing all types of discrimination.
They suggested, next, that the letter of
inquiry request that the firm provide
employment information similar to
that included in the EEO-1 form
filed with the EEOC. This informa­
tion would include the number of
women lawyers presently, and pre­
viously, employed by the firm, their
length of service, their area of
specialization, and the promotional
and work assignment practices and
experiences of the firm with respect
to their women attorneys. They
proposed the excluded group would
include not only those who admitted
discriminatory practices in response
to the letter of inquiry, but also those
whose responses to the above ques­
tionnaire would indicate a practice of
differential treatment toward women.
After consideration of the Faculty
report and the various comments of
student groups and individual stu­
dents, the Law School adopted the
following policy. The printed brochure
of the Placement Office now contains
a statement on discrimination. An
additional letter of instructions has
been sent to all groups seeking to use
the placement facilities. The action
chosen in response to specific com­
plaints will be determined by the
Director of Placement acting in con­
sultation with the Dean and, to the
extent necessary, with members of
the Faculty.
The statement of policy describes
the most frequent instances of
alleged sex, discrimination listed
above, and contains the following
language: "We believe that the
goal of equal employment opportu­
nity, which is, of course, embodied
in federal and state laws forbidding
discrimination in employment, is
inherent in the ideals of the legal
profession and represents a special
obligation of the profession as well
as of the Law School. We assume that
prospective employers using the
facilities of our Placement Office ac­
knowledge that obligation, and we
expect that their erriployment policies
will be consistent with it.
"Special concern as to discrimina­
tion based on sex has arisen in recent
years as a result of the increasing
number of women graduating from
law school. In our Law School as in
others there are now a substantial
number of women students of high
ability and with serious professional
aims. As law students they show not
merely intellectual capacity but the
full range of other qualities likely to
make effective lawyers. We believe
that their opportunities in the legal
profession have not been as wide as
for men. To a considerable extent this
is no doubt a matter of tradition, due
in part to the fact that in the past
only a small number of women have
chosen to follow legal careers. We
strongly hope that as wider opportu­
nities are afforded women lawyers
to demonstrate their talents this tra­
dition will change."
The instructional letter sent to
prospective interviewers contains
the following information: "Ques­
tions or complaints concerning
possible discrimination have occa­
sionally arisen in the past as a result
of interviews at the Law School.
Should such questions arise, it will
be the policy of the School to inform
the firm, by a letter addressed to the
partner or associate who conducted
the interview, of the pertinent com­
plaint and to invite an appropriate
response, in order to dispel misun­
derstandings and to clarify the firm's
policy.
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26 This past winter, the Moot CourtCommittee sponsored a series of
evening meetings dealing with appel­
late practice. They were intended to
supplement, rather than replace, the
practice arguments which have long
been the staple of Moot Court. Each
meeting focused upon the circum­
stances of an actual appeal. The
"instructor" for the session was the
attorney who wrote the brief and
argued the appeal. "Faculty" for the
series included prominent members of
the Chicago Bar.
The seminars were designed to
reduce two long-standing Moot
Court problems. First, while Moot
Court can provide practice in brief
writing and oral argument there
should be some mechanism for pro­
viding competitors with the informed
criticism upon which the subsequent
practice can effectively build. Second,
the program is too often simply an
extension of the classroom experi­
ence-the dissection and analysis of
cases and the hypothetical variations
based on those cases.
In the past, criticism has come
principally from the student-advisors
and judges. The experience of the
student-advisors-not significantly
greater than that of the second-year
competitor-does not lend itself to
useful criticism. Further, because the
advisor is not as familiar with the
law or record as his advisee, he sel­
dom evaluates critically the strength
or weakness of the potential argu­
ments and strategies available to the
competitor.
The judges-whether members of
the judiciary, attorneys from down­
town, or faculty-are often in a
Moot Court Seminar
similar pOSItIOn. The extracurricular
nature of this work for them makes
it impossible for them to spend a
great deal of time on the law or
record. Moreover, judges-other than
faculty-are understandably reluctant
to comment harshly upon student
performance. Judges' comments tend
to be general. They are seldom
directed to the questions of strategy,
such as the choosing and phrasing of
issues and arguments.
In sum, most of the learning experi­
ence in Moot Court has come from
the practice itself and the competitor's
own evaluation of his decisions. The
value of this type of experience
is understandably limited.
The second problem has further
limited the value of Moot Court.
Because it deals largely with case
analysis, student argument, both writ­
ten and oral, tends generally to be
objective.
The oral argument itself is often
little more than a duplication of the
classroom exercise of analyzing ma­
jority and minority prose. The com­
petitor is badgered-most ably by the
faculty, considerably practiced, and
thereby skilled in this art-and
through the competitions he gains
some measure of poise and the ability
to state accurately where he stands
on the issues. But there is little chance
for the competitor to practice per­
suading judges as opposed simply to
stating his legal position. Indeed,
frequently the competitor does not
realize there is more to achieve than
a coherent set of legal conclusions.
The seminars helped considerably
in reducing these deficiencies. Prior
to each meeting, some students would
prepare legal arguments and state­
ments of facts based on the materials
available to the attorneys, but without
reference to the attorneys' work. The
other participants were supplied with
the student work as well as the
actual briefs in the case. At the semi­
nar, the attorney would open with a
general statement of the strategy of
the appeal, with particular reference
to the legal and factual strengths and
weaknesses of the case for each side.
The attorney would then evaluate
the student work. The discussion
would then focus on the comparison
of the student work with that of the
attorney, using the frequent differ­
ences as specific examples of the
larger principles of argument devel­
opment, case use, tone and language.
In the seminars, the students
received advice from one who had
spent far more time on the case than
the students, who knew thoroughIy
what could and could not be argued,
and who therefore could more under­
standingly evaluate the student work.
Also-and, I think, more impor­
tantly-through the comparison of
the attorney's work with that of
the students, it was possible to ana­
lyze, from specific examples, the
skills of appellate advocacy. It was
this comparison which was the heart
of the seminar. As the discussion
focused upon the comparison, all
seminar participants-not just the
ones who prepared material for that
week-were able to benefit.
John M. Friedman, Jr. '70
Chairman, Hinton Moot
Court Committee
Amass meeting was held bytudents on Tuesday, May 5, to
determine an appropriate student
response to the events in Cambodia
and at Kent State. Over 300 students
were in attendance. Most of the
discussion centered on the appropri­
ateness of a "strike" as a means of
symbolic protest. A motion not to
attend classes from that day through
Monday, May 11, was overwhelm­
inglyapproved.
However, the sense of the group
was that the time taken from classes
should be efficiently used, devoted to
peace-promoting activities. It was to
be clear that the action was not
a strike against the University or
Law School but rather an effort to
"free-up" time for concentrated
political protest and action.
No request was made of the
Faculty to suspend classes during the
period. No coercion was to be directed
to students not wishing to par­
ticipate. Those students not participat­
ing in the peace activities continued
to attend classes.
The following were some of the
activities engaged in by students
during the period of the strike: First,
a resolution was drafted expressing
"concern over the war, the 'erosion'
of Constitutional government, and of
the violence erupting in the Nation."
The resolution was then distributed
in both the Law School and sur­
rounding community. Ultimately,
approximately 6,000 signatures were
obtained in support of the resolution.
There was also an effort to discuss
the issues in the community at large.
There was simultaneous effort to urge
citizens to greater involvement, to
Cambodia
and
Kent State
express their own concerns. Part of
this process was achieved during
the petitioning campaign. It took
place in the Loop, shopping centers
in northern and western suburbs,
as well as the surrounding Hyde Park
and South Shore communities.
Additional material was distributed
concerning the availability of reduced­
rate "public" telegrams. Cards indi­
eating disapproval of the escalation
of the war were distributed and
passers-by were asked to sign them
and send them on to the Congress.
A small group of students
traveled to Washington as part of the
nationwide lobbying effort. The mass
migration to Washington of some
of the eastern schools was rejected as
financially impractical. It was felt,
however, that some representation
from the Law School would be
appropriate.
A group of students have worked
this summer in a variety of key
Congressional races. More plan,
at this point, to work this fall.
In any event, one of the clear effects
of this effort has been a mobilization
of the energies of a substantial
portion of the student body in
the political process.
The following is the statementmade by Dean Nealon behalf of
the Faculty on May 10, 1970,
articulating the policy of the Law
School after the recent events in
Cambodia and at Kent State:
"We understand the deep feelings
aroused in many students by the
events of recent days. We share
the sense of crisis. But we also
believe, with utmost earnestness,
that the Law School should continue
its educational functi�ns in the normal
manner through the remainder of
the academic year. Students who
consider that their time during the
remaining weeks can best be used by
continuing their educational tasks,
and in some cases completing the
training necessary to enable them to
be admitted to the bar this summer,
are entitled to nothing less. In
addition, the Faculty considers that
it has a responsibility to the University
and the society to persevere in main­
taining the essential character and
aims of the University. A society
has no less need of the values a
university holds in trust-including
free and dispassionate inquiry-
in times of political crisis than in times
of calm. Indeed the need is greater.
"In our view, it would not serve
these aims to abandon the regular
program of instruction or to alter or
dilute academic standards and
requirements. The faculty appreciates
that the overriding national concerns
present difficult questions of priority
for all of us and make difficult the
maintenance of a commitment to
studies. While we hope that most
students will nevertheless feel capable
of carrying on as students in a manner
compatible with their obligation as
citizens, we respect the need for
individual choice in this matter and
recognize that some students may
conscientiously feel unable to continue
their academic studies during. the
remainder of the quarter.
"We have considered methods by
which individual students who con­
clude that they must suspend aca­
demic work may make up the work
27
28 without having to repeat the quarter.
'We have decided that where, upon
petition of a student, the Dean of
Students after consultation with the
instructor concludes that special
consideration is warranted, the stu­
dent will be permitted to take the
examination in the course, or submit
any required written work, after
the close of the quarter. As soon as
petitions are received, the timing of
any make-up examinations will be
determined promptly. Consideration
will be given to setting a make-up
period during the week preceding the
opening of the fall quarter."
The University of ChicagoLaw School has been well
represented in the recent Illinois
Constitutional Convention. Alumni
who are delegates to the Convention,
and their committee assignments,
include: Frank Cicero, Jr. '65
(Revenue, Drafting); Ray H. Gar­
rison '49 (Revenue); Elmer Gertz
'30 (Chairman, Bill of Rights);
Malcolm S. Kamin '64 (Education);
Mary Lee Leahy '66 (General Gov­
ernment, Drafting); David Linn '40
(Judiciary); Paul E. Mathias '27
(Chairman, Education); Bernard
Weisberg '52 (Bill of Rights, Rules).
In addition, a number of members
of the Faculty have also been involved.
Two members of the Faculty were
authors of resource papers on probable
Convention issues which were
published in Con-Con, Issues tor the
Illinois Constitutional Convention by
the University of Illinois Press.
Professor Jo Desha Lucas was author
of "Legal Aspects of Revenue";
Professor Edmund W. Kitch was
author of the paper on "Business
Regulations: Transportation." Pro­
fessor Dallin Oaks spent a portion of
his sabbatical leave from the Law
School as Staff Council to the Bill of
Rights Committee. Professor Frank
Zimring testified before the Bill of
Rights Committee on hand guns
and gun control. Professor Philip
Kurland testified before the Judiciary
Committee and a joint meeting of
the committees on the Bill of Rights
and Education.
A number of students, as well,
were involved in preparing research
material for the Convention. David
Kroot and Catherine Soffer, both
second year students, prepared
a number of research materials on job
discrimination issues discussed by
the Convention.
The Managing Board of the LawReview has decided to expand
the past year's experimental writing
competition to make it available to
the entire first-year class. The writing
competition will be held during the
summer.
All first year students interested in
the competition have been invited,
after June 9, to select among a variety
of comment topics on file in the Law
Review office. During the summer
the competitors and editor to whom
they are assigned will engage in the
traditional comment-writing process.
The communication, of course, will
be by mail instead of by conference.
During the course of the summer
all competitors who have completed
a preliminary comment draft "of
promise" will be invited to join
the Review. On August 15, when
all first year grades have been
completed, the Editor-in-Chief will
determine the number of students
who have been invited by that time
to join the Review through the
competition. An estimate will then
be made, on the basis of the reports
from the Editorial Board, of the
number of additional competitors who
are likely to produce qualifying drafts
within the following month. On
the basis of these figures, to complete
the staff, an additional number of
students will be invited to join
the Review on first year grades.
This selection process has been
chosen to give the writing program
a primary position in staff selection
and to make certain that there are
positions available for all who are
successful in the competition.
All students who are invited
by late August either on the basis of
the writing competition or their
grades will return to the Law School
to begin work on the Law Review
on September 9. Those in the writing
competition who have not been
invited to candidacy by late August
will be encouraged to continue
working on their topics. Upon their
return to school in late September
they will have the opportunity to
continue their work with a special
group of third year Law Reuieio
editors.
The writing competition will
conclude on November 16, 1970.
At that time all of the competitors'
work will be evaluated. All members
of the competition who have produced
satisfactory comment drafts "of
promise" will be invited to join the
Reoieur.
SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE was the
speaker at the traditional dinner of
the entering class held on September
29, 1969. His remarks dealt with
the potential contributions to society
which may be made by lawyers.
Some excerpts from his remarks
follow:
"There are also aspects of our
present governmental crises which
cannot be written off by the absence
of clear solutions or the explosiveness
of the issues. What is in a way most
troubling is our growing paralysis
before an alarming number of practi­
cal problems for which we do have
plain answers.... In too many areas
... such as air and water pollution,
urban transportation, and medical
facilities, to name only a few, we
know what is wrong; we know how
to stop it; there is no ideological bar
and no emotional resistance to doing
what it takes; the cost is not
prohibitive-and yet desperately
little is done."
Conferences
and
Special Events
"
Partly, I suppose, the problem
is the familiar one of remoteness.
For many of us, the government is
no longer "we" but "it"-not plural
but singular, not first person but
third, not personal but neuter. It
was not meant to work that way.
Self-government is a delusion if we
can no longer affirm in some mean­
ingful sense that the government
is ourselves."
"Lawyers bring certain skills to
this sort of work which will serve
them in good stead. As a group,
they have intelligence, articulateness,
and a certain primitive aggressive­
ness.... They are trained to be
analytical and to make their passions
work for them and not against them.
Most important, they are the best and
most experienced persuaders we
have."
"There is work enough . . . for all
the lawyers and all the radical spirits
in the country. I very much hope that
you will take the work and like it."
Senator Edmund S. Muskie
A CONFERENCE on The Legal and
Economic Aspects of Conglomerates,
sponsored jointly by the Law School
and Business School, was held at the
Law School on October 17-18, 1969.
Over three hundred leading lawyers
and corporate executives were in
attendance. The Conference consisted
of four sessions featuring both speak­
ers and discussants. The conference
was supported by the Charles R.
Walgreen Foundation.
At the opening session Peter O.
Steiner, Professor of Law and Eco­
nomics at the University of Michigan,
spoke on "Conglomerates and the
Public Interest." He was followed by
Edwin M. Zimmerman of Covington
& Burling, formerly head of the
Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, who spoke on "Conglomerates
and Antitrust Policy." William Ken­
neth Jones, Professor of Law at
Columbia University, was the
discussant.
At the second session, Michael
Gort, Professor of Economics at the
State University of New York at
Buffalo, and Thomas F. Hogarty,
Professor of Economics at Northern
Illinois University and a former mem­
her of the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, spoke on "Conglomer­
ates-Their Magnitude, Differential
Success, and Effects on Securities
Prices of Merged Firms." The second
paper at the session was given by
James H. Lorie, Professor of Busi­
ness Administration at the University
of Chicago, and was entitled "Con­
glomerates: The Rhetoric and the
Evidence." The discussants at this
session were Willard F. Mueller,
formerly Chief Economist and Direc-
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30 tor of the Bureau of Economics of
the Federal Trade Commission, and
Richard A. Posner, Professor of Law
at the University of Chicago.
At the third session David
Tillinghast, partner in the New York
law firm of Hughes, Hubbard &
Reed, spoke on "The Impact of the
Tax System on Conglomerate
Acquisitions: The Mills Bill and
Beyond." Sidney Davidson, Dean of
the Graduate School of Business and
the Arthur Young Professor of
Accounting, discussed "The Ac­
counting Aspects of Conglomerates."
Edward C. Schmults, partner in
White & Case, spoke on "Defensive
Tactics Against Takeovers." Wilbur
Katz, former Dean at the University
of Chicago Law School and now
Professor of Law at the University
of Wisconsin, was the discussant.
At the final session, Manuel F.
Cohen, former chairman of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission,
spoke on "Conglomerates-Effects on
Corporation Law, and Legislative
Responses." George J. Stigler, the
Charles R. Walgreen Distinguished
Service Professor of American
Institutions at the University of
Chicago, concluded the conference
with "Conglomerates: An Overview."
AT THE CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZED
CRIME held on February 26 and 27,
1970 at the University of Chicago
Law School, Gordon Hawkins, Re­
search Fellow in the Law School's
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice,
suggested the concept of a highly
organized national crime syndicate
was a "myth" created largely by the
Donald R. Cressev addressing the final session of the Conference 012 Organized Crime.
F.B.1. for self-serving budgetary pur­
poses. He argued the chief evidence
offered by the proponents of the
concept-the Appalachian meeting in
1957, Joseph Valachi's testimony
before the Kefauver Committee, the
1967 President's Task Force on
Organized Crime-clearly failed as
support for the existence of such a
national organization.
The significance of the dispute
over the existence or nonexistence of
a national organization was summa­
rized by Hawkins: "As long as we
are determined to continue by means
of criminal law to prevent people
from obtaining goods and services
which they have clearly demonstrated,
and continue to demonstrate, that
they do not intend to forego, crimi­
nals will supply those goods and
services. It is a myth that it is all due
to a gigantic organized conspiracy
and that all we need to do is catch
the conspirators." More importantly,
he suggested that "belief in this
myth prevents us from looking at
the real nature of the problem."
The first session of the conference
dealt with the general factual ques­
tion: the existence or nonexistence
of a national crime organization.
Papers at this session were delivered
by Hawkins, Dwight C. Smith, Jr.
of the State University of New York
at Albany, and Charles Siragusa,
Executive Director of the Illinois
Crime Investigating Commission.
The second session dealt with the
nature and extent of the impact of
organized crime, whether or not na­
tional in scope, on society. Speakers
at this' session included Daniel
Walker, former president of the
Chicago Crime Commission, Thomas
Schelling, Professor of Economics at
Harvard University, and Milton G.
Rector, Director of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency.
The final session of the Conference
involved the counter-measures avail­
able to counteract organized criminal
activities. Speakers at this session
were Earl Johnson, [r., of the Uni­
versity of Southern California Law
Center and Donald R. Cressey,
Professor of Sociology at the Univer­
sity of California at Santa Barbara.
Daniel Walker and Thomas Schelling
A CONFERENCE on Clinical Education
and the Law School of the Future
was held October 31 and November 1,
1969. It consisted of both the
presentation of papers and panel
discussions. Among the topics
discussed at the conference were:
Financing Student Clinical Pro­
grams; Clinical Experience in
American Legal Education: Why
has it Failed; Clinical Teaching
in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal
Education; Goals, Models and
Prospects for Clinical-Legal Edu­
cation; The Practice of Law by Law
Students: An Analysis. The par­
ticipants included: Robert A. Burt,
John M. Ferren, W. Burnett Harvey,
William Pincus, J. Wayne Reitz,
Prebel Stolz, William P. Creger,
Robert J. Glaser, Steven M. Fleishes,
and conference co-ordinator Edmund
W. Kitch. Student participants
included Carol Cowgill, William G.
Hoerger, and Michael D. Ridberg.
Conference resources papers have
been published and can be obtained
by writing to the University of
Chicago Law School.
AN ALUMNI DAY was held
at the Law School on Friday,
February 27, 1970. More than
250 alumni were present. The pro­
gram began with a series of small
seminars led by members of the
faculty: Questions of Federal Tax­
Walter Blum; Air Pollution-David
Currie; a discussion of the Law
School curriculum with members of
the Faculty Curriculum Committee.
An ample cocktail hour was held
for those classes which were holding
mini reunions during the period.
Over thirty members of the Class of
1949, with their spouses, were
in attendance. The speakers for the
evening were Dean Phil C. Neal and
Professor Grant Gilmore. The text
of Gilmore's remarks can be found on
page 15 of the Record. Based upon
the number of alumni present, and
their general enthusiasm-for the
event, the camaraderie or, in some
rare cases, the ample cocktail session
-the event was very well received.
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THE FIFTH HENRY SIMONS LECTURE
was delivered by James Tobin,
Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale
University, on April 16, 1970. The
Simons Lecture is an institution
at the Law School established in honor
of Professor Henry Simons, the
distinguished economist who for many
years was both a member of ·the
Department of Economics and
Professor of Economics in the Law
School. The title of Professor Tobin's
lecture was "On Limiting the Domain
of Inequality."
James Tobin, second tram right, talking prior to Simons Lecture with, among others, Ronald
Coase and Milton Friedman.
32 THE ANNUAL DINNER of the Alumni
Association of the Law School
was held on April 30, 1970 at the
Guild Hall of the Ambassador West.
The principal speaker was Edward H .•
Levi, President of the University
of Chicago. More than 550 alumni
were present. It was the largest
Annual Dinner in the history of the
Law School and quite clearly a tribute
to the former Dean of the Law
School.
The three-year Fund For TheLaw School is now in its final
year. The Fund is an effort to raise
$5,000,000 of capital support to meet
the School's most urgent needs. The
Alumni portion of the goal is
$1,600,000.
The three-year effort began in
January of 1968. It will end this
December. To date, $1,400,000 of the
$1,600,000 goal has been contributed
or pledged.
The credit to date must go to the
Alumni responsible for The Fund
For The Law School. The General
Chairman of the campaign has been
Harry N. Wyatt '21. The Chairman
of the Special Gifts Committee has
been Bernard G. Sang, '35. The Co­
Chairmen for Class Organizations
have been Andrew C. Hamilton, '28
and Jean Allard, '53.
A great deal of the early success of
the campaign has been a result of the
extraordinary efforts of Bernard Sang
and his Special Gifts Committee.
For the remainder of the campaign,
the Class Organizations will be
particularly important. A considerable
Alumni
number of individuals with records
of regular support of the Law
School have not yet contributed for
each year of the three-year effort.
This is not a small group.
There are approximately 4,200
alumni of the Law School. Almost 70
per cent have contributed to one or
more of the past annual campaigns.
In 1967, the last annual campaign
prior to the three-year effort, 45 per
cent of the alumni contributed. In
1968, the first year of the campaign,
28 per cent contributed. That repre­
sented 714 fewer alumni participating
than the prior year. That reduction is
partially explained by the emphasis
which had been directed to the Spe­
cial Gifts effort during that period.
Broad participation was not stressed.
Last year, 1969, 37 per cent of
our alumni contributed. That repre­
sented a gain of 8 per cent or 379
alumni. This is still far below the 45
per cent of alumni participation
achieved by Chicago in 1967 or the
50 per cent figures recently achieved
by the law schools at Columbia and
Yale.
The future strength of the Law
School will be dependent upon a
broad base of alumni support. The
re-establishment of such a base will be
the goal of the Class Organizations
during the final solicitation in The
Fund For The Law School which
will take place during the fall.
The Board of Directors of theLaw School Alumni Association,
which has responsibility for selecting
and supervising all of the alumni
activities at the Law School, at its
last meeting on April 23 made two
significant changes in its organiza­
tional structure. First, a third class of
Directors was appointed. One third
of the Board will be elected each year.
In addition, the Board adopted a
provision requiring that retiring
members of the Board be ineligible
for reappointment for one year fol­
lowing the expiration of their term.
These provisions were adopted to give
more diversified membership to the
Board and to encourage broader par­
ticipation in the determination of
the activities of the Association.
Second, an Executive Committee
was created. It consists of the Officers
of the Association: William G.
Burns '31, J. Gordon Henry '41,
Richard H. Levin '37, Milton 1.
Shadur '49, Jean Allard '53, James
McClure, Jr. '49, Alan R. Orschel '64,
Ronald J. Aronberg '57, Arnold 1.
Shure '29; and five other members
appointed from the Board: Jerome S.
Weiss '30, Lee C. Shaw '38, Miles
Jaffe '50, Elmer W. Johnson '57, and
Joseph V. Karaganis '66.
The new President of the Associ­
ation, William Burns '31, re-
quested that a report be prepared
for a meeting of the Executive
Committee on July 29 reviewing the
past activities of the Association, the
types of activities carried out by
alumni associations at other law
schools, and activities at the Law
School in which greater alumni par­
ticipation would be helpful.
Committees have since been
established to develop the ideas dis­
cussed at that meeting.
